TOP SECRET

13 February 1953

General William C. Chase
Chief, MAAG

Dear General Chase,

I wish to thank you for your letter of February 5 1953 and to reply to the four points referred to as follows:-

a. I fully agree in principle that you be informed before any "significant" raids are to be made on Communist-held territory. However, I should be glad if you would be good enough to clarify to me the meaning of the word "significant" and the extent to which the word is applicable.

b. I am, in principle, prepared to consider your suggestion that immediate thought be given to and plans made to blockade the China Mainland, with respect to Chinese Communist shipping only, from Swatow to Ma-chen, both inclusive, and that you be informed of these plans. I am unable, however, to make out whether by "Chinese Communist shipping" you imply only those ships flying Chinese Communist flag or all ships carrying supplies to the Communist ports between Ma-chen and Swatow. I am of the opinion that the most effective type of blockade would be one which covers all vessels entering Communist ports, irrespective of nationality and that it is only when the entire coast-line of the Communist-held mainland is placed under a blockade of this nature that we could achieve our objective of inflicting serious damage on the economic structure of the Communist regime.

Aside from this proposal of blockading the waters between Swatow and Ma-chen, we have no information as to whether or not the United States Government has developed an overall plan for blockading the entire coastline. If such a plan has already been made, we should be glad to know of it so that we could reassess our naval strength in relation to the part we can play in the overall scheme.

If our Navy is to blockade only the waters between Swatow and Ma-chen, it is still possible to inflict a limited amount of damage on the economy of the Communist regime provided that the blockade is to be of a general nature as understood in the customary sense of the word. I would be willing to consider the adoption of such a plan although no spectacular results may be expected. In that event, it will be necessary for the United States to consider the possible reaction from other countries, chiefly the United Kingdom, and to give us the necessary political support.

If the blockade is limited to the stopping of vessels flying the flag of the Communist regime only, and is not be applied to vessels of other nationalities, I am of the opinion that the result would not justify the effort in view of the very small number of vessels of that description plying in waters within that section of the China coast.

c. I am in full agreement with your recommendation that plans be made to increase the frequency of raids, not only from the "off-shore" islands, but also from Taiwan and the Pescadores and that both little raids and big ones be planned and executed on a wide front in order to obtain prisoners and to worry and confuse the Communist coastal defences. An increase in the number of raids from the "off-shore" islands, however, calls for additional military aid in the form of continuous supply of replacements of equipment in landing operations. Furthermore, for such raids to be effective, it will be necessary to extend the present scope of military aid to include assistance for our troops stationed on the "off-shore" islands as well as for the guerrillas.

As to the large-scale raids from Taiwan and the Pescadores on the more distant coast of the Communist-held mainland, it will be necessary to despatch more troops of high combat efficiency. However, the delay in the arrival of arms and equipment has had a limited effect in the number of troops of that category. I hope, therefore, that you will be good enough to request that the delivery of military aid items that have already been allocated be speeded up and that the amount of military aid be increased. It is also hoped that transportation equipment and equipment for landing operations as well as PT boats for reconnoitering purposes on the high seas be added to the original items of military aid. Such additional items could be supplied on a land-lease or some other basis.

d. I am in agreement with your recommendation that our naval surface reconnaissance and our CAF air reconnaissance be increased in order to secure more information about the enemy and about shipping in the Taiwan Straits. I assure you that steps to implement these measures will be taken in the very near future.

In connection with the above, I am deeply concerned over the lack of close coordination between the military authorities of China and those of the United States. You will recall that I said on February 3 '52, prior to your trip to the United States, that "...the maintenance of security of the general Pacific area including Taiwan in addition to mere neutralization of this island, then we who are responsible for the defense of Taiwan

would like to see the early organization under secrecy of a Chinese US Combined Staff which would be responsible for related military plans and operations for various possible emergencies." I have repeated the same views on various occasions when we met to discuss our mutual problems. The necessity for the establishment of a Combined Staff Organization has become more urgent with the lifting of restrictions on military operations directed towards the mainland from Taiwan as announced by President Eisenhower. I should be glad, therefore, if you would consider recommending to your Government the early establishment of the proposed Combined Staff Organization for the purpose of deciding upon a coordinated plan of operations.

There is another urgent matter to which I wish to invite your attention, and that is the problem of air defense of the island against possible air-raids launched by the Communist following the blockade of the coastline of Communist-held mainland and an increase in the number of raids as recommended in "b" and "c" in your letter. This problem requires mutual discussion and planning and seems to argue also for the prompt establishment of a Sino-American Combined Staff Organization. When Major General Howard M Turner, Air Section, United States Far East Survey Group, visited Taiwan in August 1950, he proposed on August 25 that a Chinese Air Force Base in Taiwan should be made available for the operation of one USAF Jet Fighter Wing and that billet be provided for 350 men. Although we completed the necessary preparations, no United States Air Force has yet arrived. This may be due to the lack of an overall plan between our two countries.

Having replied to the various points raised in your letter, I wish in conclusion, to bring up the following points for your consideration:

1. The speedy establishment of a Combined Sino-American Staff Organization.

2. An operational plan for the joint defense of Taiwan with particular reference to adequate air defense. Until jet aircraft are made available to the CAF and in sufficient numbers for the effective defense of Taiwan, it is hoped that a USAF Jet Fighter Wing, as originally envisaged, be despatched to Taiwan at an early date.

3. The speedy delivery of military aid items that have already been allocated, an increase in the amount of military aid and the extension of the scope of military aid to include aid for our troops stationed in the off-shore islands and for our guerrilla units.

4. Transport and landing craft required for increased raids as well as PT boats, which are outside the MDAP program, be made available.

Your consideration of, and reply to, the above four points and of the views expressed on the points raised in your letter will be much appreciated.

With my best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. CHOW
General
Chief of General Staff
Ministry of National Defense